Daily Interesting News: Longform

Daily Interesting News Daily news about generic category, long form, long lenght articles, for all read fan. Miscellanous news, general news, amazing news, story, stories, long articles story, internet story.

ADS

Hot

Post Top Ad

Visualizzazione post con etichetta Longform. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta Longform. Mostra tutti i post

giovedì 20 aprile 2017

On Island: Journeying to Penal Colonies, from Rikers to Robben

11:29 0

On journeys to Rikers Island in New York City and Robben Island in South Africa, Roohi Choudhry examines issues of incarceration and racism, and envisions a day when the convicted are no longer exiled to penal colonies.

Roohi Choudhry | Longreads | April 2017 | 14 minutes (3,556 words)

The Rikers Island jail complex, built on an island just off the borough of Queens in New York City, has been described as the world’s largest penal colony. It has seen its share of controversies, many of them involving issues of race. Rikers is no exception to the disproportionate and mass incarceration of Black and Latino people in the United States.
Over the past year, an independent commission, led by the former chief judge of New York, has studied the jail, and on April 2nd, it released its recommendation: shut down Rikers. New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio has also backed the recommended course of action, which aims to have the last inmate depart the jail within 10 years.
In place of Rikers, the plan proposes building smaller jails inside New York City’s boroughs to eventually house half its current number of inmates. At the heart of this proposal is the view that people who are sent to jail are from the community, not “other.” This view dictates that they should stay in the community during their jail term. That is, people who have been arrested or convicted should not be cast away on an island, out of sight, mind and empathy.
It’s an idea once espoused by the writer and activist Grace Paley in “Six Days: Some Rememberings,” the story of her time in prison, during which a fellow inmate tells her: “That was a good idea… to have a prison in your own neighborhood, so you could keep in touch, yelling out the window.” It’s also an idea in keeping with racial justice: Black and brown lives matter, and cannot be so easily discarded when they are seen.
In the following essay, originally published in March 2015 on The Butter, I explore these ideas by comparing Rikers to another racially charged penal colony that has already been closed down: Robben Island, off the coast of Cape Town, South Africa. That island was once infamous for imprisoning Apartheid-era political prisoners (including Nelson Mandela), but is now a museum and tourist destination.
By commingling my journeys to both islands in this essay, I question what it means to banish our “unwanted,” whether because of crime, politics or disease, across the sea, far from the safety of our mainland. Is this impulse truly part of our nature? Using my experiences of these two places, I confront questions of nature, both of the land and of people, and how that nature collides with questions of race.
* * *
I am early and alone, and this might have been enough to set me apart from the crowd. Ticket in hand, I am waiting for the collector to open his booth for the first Robben Island tour of the day. In the vaulted-ceiling departure area, all dark wood and slate and frosted glass, Robben Island’s history is sketched as a timeline across three walls. In the 1600s, the Dutch cast their unfit slaves and political prisoners there. In the 1800s, the British used the island as a leper colony and lunatic asylum. In the 1940s, it became a garrison. Only in the 1960s did the South African government build the notorious maximum security prison on Robben Island that housed Mandela, Kathrada, Sisulu and hundreds of political prisoners during the country’s Apartheid era.
Now, the entire island is a museum. A ticketed destination. Behind me, the waiting area is bustling with middle-aged Europeans in khaki bermuda shorts, white t-shirts and pastel cardigans with sleeves folded around their shoulders. A group of Dutch tourists, I think, from the clunks and twists of their words.
This is my first trip to Cape Town in many years. My last visit of any significant length was in 1989, when I was eleven years old and on holiday with my parents from our then-home in Gaborone, Botswana. I remember a few details. The mustard and black polka-dot leggings I’d shivered in for most of the wintry trip. Waves beating in churned-cream fury against the rocks at Neptune’s Dairy beach. A maitre d’ ushering us politely out of the Mount Nelson hotel’s magnificent tea room. I remember the powdery face of an old white woman sipping from her china cup, watching our exile to the hotel’s blustery terrace where Indians and Coloureds and perhaps even Blacks were allowed to sit. Though I cannot be sure I have not invented her since.
Twenty years later, boarding our gleaming white catamaran to Robben Island, I feel keenly that hotel’s proximity, my unwanted shadow cast across tea room sameness. I climb the steel steps to the open deck of the ferry. The white of the seats and the silver beneath my feet are almost blinding under the cloudless day, and the wind whips through my t-shirt mercilessly. But I was first in line, so I find and take the front seat in the front row of the top deck.
As Cape Town recedes, tourists crowd around the prow with their cameras to capture the city. No one needs a flash under this glorious sun. The grey-brick Nelson Mandela gateway fades in the distance as everyone’s gaze rises instead to looming Table Mountain, in whose lap the city is scattered. The cameras are wild in frenzied marveling. But soon, the wind has the tourists beaten back to their seats, and we all clutch at railings for support.
As the island nears, a close warmth gathers in my throat, my thudding chest. I did not expect this reaction, or any emotion at all. Who am I to dread this island? When I was in Cape Town last, the island was still a prison, but I was only a child. My family eventually moved to South Africa in 1992, just as the past was beginning to crumble. And today, I am South African only between the green covers of my passport, and during these annual visits from my home in Brooklyn, New York. Even my tongue has betrayed me; I am a New Yorker even in my speech. So, who am I to fear this place?
* * *
AP Photo/Seth Wenig, File
Across the world, a few weeks later, there are no tickets, cameras, ferries, and hardly the rumor of sunlight. Here, my co-worker and I wait under the shelter of a wooden trailer, just barely shielded from falling snow, for our assigned Corrections Officer of the day. Shivering, I glance regretfully at my Dunkin’ Donuts cup lying in an open trash can a few feet away. The stench from the river was too overwhelming, as always. I could barely keep my breakfast steady in my stomach, much less finish the coffee I brought with me.
We are at the Queens-side “mainland” entrance to the Rikers Island Correctional Facility, the New York City island jail where detainees await trial and sentenced inmates serve out their less-than-a-year time. More than 13,000 inmates are housed here daily. Some call it the world’s largest penal colony. A mile-long bridge over the fetid river separates us from the island.
My co-worker and I are here for our work as researchers, studying the effectiveness of a social program in the men’s jail. The program is designed to help men transition back into their communities once they leave here. Traveling to the jail from our homes in Brooklyn took us close to two hours this morning, and that because we were able to expense a taxi for part of the way. We watch the Q100 bus transporting jail visitors trundle over the bridge and wonder how long that sole public transportation to the jail might take us.
Finally, the officer arrives, jumping out of a blue van, clutching the form permitting us into Rikers for the day. We follow her to the Plexiglas window behind which another officer sits. A few minutes later, we have a pair of plastic numbered badges in exchange for our IDs.
The officer gives us a ride over the river, and we chat about her son, her recent hospital visit, her stylish new handbag. We have some brief sense of her life from these weekly trips. An expanse of ink stretches from either side of the bridge, low planes dip over La Guardia Airport just along the other side of the river. Below us, water choked with weeds and cans breaks against rocks jammed against the banks of the mainland. Then, the concrete and barbed wire of the jail loom against the grey morning and blot out everything else.
Off the bridge, we are “on island” as the officers call it, immersed in this destination’s own ecology of fencing and trucks and men in identical jumpsuits sweeping or picking up trash. The officer smooths our way through two more checkpoints with little asides and insides, other officers peer at our badges as they shoot back their practiced one-liners. It’s surprisingly difficult to get into a jail.
Finally, we pull up to one of the six men’s facilities; this is where we are conducting our study. Inside, the air is so densely acrid, I can taste the metal of each surface. I am just as conscious here as around those tourists in Cape Town of the precise contours of my body, exactly how I might appear to others. But this time, less for color and more for shape, for being a woman in this place.
As at Robben Island, I struggle with my reactions to this island. I am fortunate, have never had to confront the justice system in any country. And yet, I am nervous around the officers, as though I have sneaked past their checkpoints. It’s as though I live on the wrong side of this river. As if I should live inside, on island.
* * *
We are about to dock at Robben Island, and panic will surely burst through my chest. Struggling to stay calm, I repeat: I have no right to these emotions. I did not suffer on this island. But the mantra can’t abate my dismay at nearing it.
The railing is still bracing cold, and its chill seeps through my veins, pulling me into the world. The rifle-fire snaps of a hundred cameras also have this rousing effect; the tourists are taking shots of the approaching jetty. I decide to pull out my own camera. Perhaps, someday, I will need help remembering this, too.
The island stretches far and flat, dotted with red roof and concrete block and stubborn green bush. Black gulls swoop, skimming sunlight off the water. We clamber off the boat and onto a waiting tour bus just off a clutch of grey-brick buildings. I find a seat toward the back this time, glad to have some space to myself.
The tour guide is a wise-cracking Capetonian; he soon has us laughing as we settle in. Do we know where the island’s name comes from? Robben is Afrikaans for seal. The Dutch nod approvingly, yes, this word comes from us. Though few seals are left here. Rabbits have taken over, and penguins–hordes of the flightless birds waddle around the island.
The bus begins a circuitous tour, longer than I had expected. This island’s topography has always consisted, in my mind, of imprisonment. Sightseeing before even getting to the prison, just one part of the tour, seems ludicrous, even offensive. I did not come here to ride around this speck of dirt farther south than the southernmost tip of Africa; an island known only for centuries of misery. The object of our pilgrimage should be singular and sacrosanct. And yet, that object is a symbol of heinous acts. And how can a prison be sacred? Confused, I try to appreciate the view from the bus, the giant cacti and endangered birds and rocky beaches.
We travel through what is still an inhabited city of a grotesque kind. The low earth so close to sea-level, the wardens’ village full of close-packed bungalows, the lepers’ graveyard. A primary school which a handful of children still attend. A church the lepers built, a different church the guards built. And, unexpectedly, a kermit-green dome rising from the dust at one end of the island. The structure is called Moturu Kramat, and is a shrine built to honor one of Cape Town’s first imams who was exiled by the Dutch and died on the island in the eighteenth century.
We pull up to a beach which, the tour guide tells us, is the best place on the island to take pictures of Table Mountain on the mainland. The Dutch crowd around every open space of grey rock around the shore, training their lenses to the smooth pen-and-ink crag of the mountain. The smoky outlines of the city seem a lifetime from this island, forsaken by the continent. I take a few pictures of the celebrated view but tire soon; I have seen the contours of this mountain on postcards and in textbooks almost all my life.
Instead, I am fascinated by the cruel petals of a succulent plant, a variety of Cape Aloe, a few steps away. I have seen a plant like this, but half the size, at the Brooklyn Botanic Gardens in the desert room, a carefully calibrated greenhouse that mimicks this climate. The aloe at Robben Island is as tall as I am, with a hundred yellow-lined brittle tentacles of green flesh, some of them curled against the sand but most raised in salutation to the sky. Pebbles of all colors are scattered about the plant’s base, and a fat, rusty pipe runs among them, along the length of the beach.
The pipe’s presence is somehow obtrusive. The greens and blues of the island had dispelled my distress, and I’d forgotten where I was; this pipe reminds me. But I cannot blame the aloe or the dry soil at the plant’s base. They did not conspire with us; we made this place what it became. I return to the celebrated view, the grey flat-topped mountain in the mist, and think about the people banished here, standing on this soil. Maybe they hated the sight of the mountain, cursed each rock and weed on the mainland. Maybe they raged at the very ground I stood on as I posed for my mother’s camera in my mustard-and-black leggings twenty years ago, against the breakers of Neptune’s Dairy.
The bus stops again a few minutes later so we can snap pictures, from the inside this time, of the island’s indigenous endangered bird, the African Oystercatcher. The duck-like black gull, an odd hiccup of history and biology, possesses tomato-red eyes, beak, and legs. Who knows how long this dinosaur will last in this place, now peopled only by caretakers and seasonal tourists. Or perhaps the bird will thrive, left in peace. As nature takes her course without us.
The bunkers are perhaps, after the imam’s shrine, the biggest surprise of this tour. Concrete blocks–each the size of a small house, painted camouflage green and black–are planted in a group and sheltered by a copse of trees. They were built during World War II in case of a German invasion. A garrison was stationed on Robben Island as a first line of defense against an attack from the ocean. The Germans never came and the succulents have taken over now, growing on the bunkers’ roofs, around them, inside them.
Finally, we’re reminded of why we’re on this surreal bus ride on a sunny island: we approach the limestone quarry. Here, Mandela and other prisoners developed eye damage from two decades of chipping away at white rock under blistering sun. This was where Kathrada, Sesulu, Mandela hatched their nascent plans for a future. Mandela called the quarry “the university” and clandestinely held regular lectures here. The prisoners could talk as they worked, if they were careful; constitutions were composed here, cabinets assembled, as they shaded their eyes from blindness.
Their shadows linger in the caves hewn into the lime cliff-face, in the eerie stillness of this place where even the Dutch are quiet.
* * *
The first gate clangs shut. We are led by another Rikers Corrections Officer into the hallway that flanks the belly of the jail, passing a reception shielded by bullet-proof glass.
An hour after our arrival at the Queens-side trailer, we’re in, walking along a wide hall from which the common areas of the jail branch off: the gym, mess hall, library, chapel. White walls are painted over with various signs advertising programs offered, instructions on where to stand and where not to step. The linoleum floor is broken every so often by a metal detector. We do not need to pass through these detectors or follow the instructions. They are for the jump-suited inmates, to be found singly every few steps, mopping the floor. The men are instructed to stand still until we, the visitors, have safely passed them by.
We conduct interviews every week in one corner of the gym, a vast space with windows set far up, close to the 20-feet-high ceilings. The weak light picks up the grime of the gym, the outline of the doorless toilet, the scratched and bitten primary colors of plastic chairs and tables scattered about.
On most days, twenty or so green-suited, mostly brown-skinned inmates are gathered already, slouching in classroom-style rows of plastic chairs in the middle of the gym. They are silent as we shuffle our papers, our pens, water bottles. I walk up and say good morning, tell them why we’re here, the questions we will ask when we call them individually to our tables. Their voices are important, I say. Only they can help us make the jail better, by sharing their stories with us.
* * *
We’re standing in the shadow of Robben Island prison. The Capetonian says his goodbyes as he hands us over to our next guide, who will take us through the prison buildings. The new man is middle-aged, a blue button-down shirt stretches over his ample belly. A baseball cap, embroidered with a rendering of the Table Mountain cable car, is pulled over his sweaty forehead. His eyes are very small, set back into the folds of his face. He was a political prisoner here, for more than ten years, part of that time spent with Mandela. Now he leads these tours of the prison and lives in the wardens’ compound nearby that still houses some of the guards from that time.
As we follow him into the prison, I try to imagine coming to live alongside the men who enforced his captivity, the notoriously cruel Robben Island guards. But then, those guards were another unwanted group, too, cast on the island by the mainland. They took the jobs voluntarily, but how many working class jobs are truly voluntary? My heart opens a crack but I slam the opening shut. I have not endured the suffering required to forgive those men.
The prison is a set of non-descript buildings topped with corrugated metal roofing. The grey brick, dull barbed-wire fencing, are a counterpoint to the brilliant blue day. We enter through double doors, left open. The cool emptiness echoes with our footsteps and coughs as we gather around the guide. Weak light falls in from a stairwell to one side. The guide begins a rehearsed speech about the censor’s office outside which we now stand. All correspondence was opened here and read. The letters the prisoners received from family arrived with passages–sometimes political, sometimes just words of comfort–cut out by the censors. I imagine prisoners carefully smoothing out scraps of paper, diaphanous as lace, eager for any news they could piece together.
He leads us upstairs, downstairs, through corridors lined with offices, through passages lined with cells and iron bars, outside one building in the complex, through a blinding courtyard into another dark building. The blue-and-whitewashed walls begin to blur, each corner a clone of the one that came before. Finally, we reach the cell that was Mandela’s, “Cell number 5,” where he spent most of his 19 years at Robben Island; 19 of the 27 years that he was imprisoned. The gate to his cell is locked, but we can peer through the bars as we crowd around the narrow corridor. The cell is six by ten feet, a barred window set in one wall. Folded bedding sits on a rolled coir sleeping mat in a corner, a tin plate and mug rest on the blanket, an aluminum toilet-bucket next to the bundle. The floor is cold cement.
Until recently, the cell was open to visitors. You could stand in the precise corner where he must have crouched and watched the back of his hand furrow with wrinkles over the years. The place where his head of black then grey then white hair must have rested on his thin mat. You could press a palm against the wall where he must have edged and steadied his shaking body when the guard came to tell him his teenage son was dead. You could linger by his window, watch the dust gather and billow around the courtyard, day disappear into evening.
Perhaps because the cell is now kept locked, and I cannot touch the corners and crevices, Mandela’s cell, which one might expect to prove the most profound moment of this tour, fails to make an impression on me.
It’s only when we gather in what used to be a dormitory–some bunk beds still stacked against a wall–that I am struck by the true ugliness of this building. The guide tells us about life at Robben Island: everyday indignities that carve a deeper horror than the abstract shell of a barred space could.
He points to two cardstock signs, magnified for this lesson. The first sign is titled: “Differences Between B and C Diets.” B, the sign tells us, are “Coloured/Asiatics.” C are “Bantus.” One can only guess that A must stand for white, but there are no instructions for white diets because there were no white prisoners at Robben Island.
Differences Between B and C Diets:
B – Coloureds/Asiatics– Bantus
Mealie meal – 6oz – BreakfastMealie meal 12oz:
Breakfast – 6oz
Supper 6oz
Bread:   4oz lunch & 4oz supperPuzamandla – lunch
Fat: 1oz daily per personFat ½ oz per person daily
Mealie rice or saapMealies
Meat:   6oz per personMeat 5 oz per person
Jam/syrup:   1oz per person dailyNo jam/syrup
Sugar:   2ozSugar 1 ½ oz
Coffee:
Breakfast – 1/8 oz
Supper 1/8 oz
Coffee:   breakfast ½ oz 1/8 oz
This sign is well-known, and I have seen its image before in books and magazines. But today, the petty divisions and measurements quicken my blood as if for the first time; the faint emphases, the deliberation of type are a new outrage. The “no jam/syrup” in particular strikes at my heart; the knowledge that, as an “Asiatic,” I could have enjoyed an ounce of jam here.
Especially after the birds and breakers of the island, I am sickened by this building. Sickened that men could ferry other men over water, cast them for decades in this concrete hole. But that, too, was not enough. Even here on this island, so full of green and blue life, men enforced unnatural divisions. I did not deserve that jam more than this man, our guide.
The second sign is a magnified identification card, this one belonging to Billy Nair, one of the Rivonia trialists; he would later become a member of parliament. At Robben Island, he was: Sentenced Prisoner No. 69/64. Religion: Hindu. Crime: Sabotasie [sabotage]. Date of sentence: 28/2/64. Date of release: 27/2/84. And two smudged thumb impressions, concentric lines in relief against black ink.
* * *
At Rikers Island, a man stares at the stapled papers between us. He has just completed the mental health inventory section of his interview, answering “yes” to each of the twelve questions (Have you felt depressed for at least two weeks? Do you avoid reminders of something terrible you witnessed?). Now he contemplates this new black-and-white indictment of him by a stranger. I shuffle my papers, but say nothing. I’m only a researcher, I can’t help. I move on to the next interview.
The young ones smirk, joke around, sit back with an eyebrow raised or an elbow against the back of their chair. Some are more earnest; they want very badly for me to know they don’t belong here. They frown as they answer questions, recalling precise details. I don’t drink often, maybe on weekends. Crack? No, nothing like that. Almost all of them snicker at the drugs inventory.
But one man has a hunted expression, his eyes dart into the corners of the gym as he answers “yes” to almost each drug category, yes, every day. He tells me the story of how he came to be here, though I have not asked. A mistake, it was all a mistake. But now he’s leaving, tomorrow, can I offer him something? A referral for services? This is a research interview, I’m sorry. I’m not a social worker. But ask your Corrections Officer, the jail can help you. He gives me a look approaching disgust.
When I began conducting interviews at Rikers, I thought I would remember the face of each man, each circumstance. The shifting eyes, the downcast eyes, the unnerving-direct eyes; the listless, the shut off, the shut down. Even though I’d already conducted research interviews for the better part of eight years, I’d never worked at a jail before. Surely, this made each man at Rikers memorable, each story was fraught with urgency, and surely each one would stay with me always. But after ten interviews, perhaps fifteen, the inmates begin to blend into a singular green jumpsuit, something to be classified and filed away in a sliding steel drawer. At first, I am distressed when I cannot recall faces, particulars, and then, I am just tired.
We conclude each interview with thanks and a handshake. The men disappear back into the innards of the jail from whence they came, where we do not go. From different trips to Rikers, I know the briefest outlines of that place. Concrete floors and televisions high up in a corner, blasting daytime talk. Rows of doors in one of the mental health units, a tiny window set in each one to observe the suicide-proofed cell. A line of dazed women with cough-syrup-size cups in their hands, waiting for medication. A room of men, a support group, and at the front, a green jumpsuit from my composite memory, this is the last time he’ll be here, he says, this is the last time. A different jail, a different city, another mental health unit, a woman thrusts her arm under my face, look, she says, look. The coffee skin of her forearm is rippled up and down with a mosaic of raised mauve scars. Look what I did, she says, I shouldn’t be here.
But they’re here at Rikers, the great unwashed unwanted, pushed as far away from our bustling mainland as we could cast them, across water so thick with our sewage that nothing could wade through. No one could escape the stink and fear between us and them.
At the end of the morning, my co-worker and I gather up our stack of forms, hearts light with our departure. Just like that, we leave Rikers, collecting our belongings from the lockers, pushing through the reluctant revolving gate out of the facility, watching the jail disappear behind us as we are driven back over the bridge. Waiting in the parking lot for our taxi, I am both groggy and giddy with relief, as if I have narrowly escaped capture. Each time I leave Rikers, it’s as though I have cheated fate, free to plunge into the city one more day.
On Rikers Island, I am an unthreatening shade of brown. I speak the right kind of English. I know all the right people. Across the water, I’m wanted, the right kind of wanted, so I do not have to fear this island. And yet, my journey to that other island so far away, the old unwantedness that journey summoned in me, lurks in a small thudding place in my chest. This thudding makes me look over my shoulder each time I leave Rikers Island.
* * *
Photo by Roohi Choudhry
We are directed to take the very dirt path out that the last Robben Island prisoners walked, perhaps ran, as they left. Just before the glittering barbed wire fence, a billboard, about six feet tall, is planted in the soil. The board is a blown-up photograph of those last prisoners on a steamer boat called the Blouberg pulling away from the island. Most of them have their arms raised in jubilation; they are yelling, leaping, almost moving within the confines of this picture. Just one man is still, his face blank, arm hanging over the side of the boat, and a hat pulled low over his forehead. Then I realize he is wearing the uniform of a guard. He was operating the boat taking free men to the mainland.
“Freedom,” proclaims the billboard. And in smaller print: “’We want Robben Island to reflect the triumph of freedom and human dignity over oppression and humiliation.’ Ahmed Kathrada, Prisoner 468/64, Robben Island 1964-1982.” I snap a photo of the board against the dust and the blue sky, against the bermuda shorts and sun hats of the next group of tourists disembarking a few feet away.
At our waiting ferry, I decide to sit below deck in the first floor cabin, shielded from the bitter winds of the journey. As the boat begins a grinding retreat from the harbor, a flock of oystercatchers caw across the jetty, as we leave them to their home. All they have seen of us is our abhorrence on this island. The only people they have known are the unwanted who were cast away and those who banished them.
So much has changed now that I can cross the ocean and visit the birds at my will. Now, I am the right kind of wanted on this island, too. But I do not think I will return.
* * *
I huddle again at the Queens trailer-hut early on a Rikers interview morning, waiting with my co-worker. A flicker of movement, and we turn to see a small cat creeping up from under the trailer onto the shaded deck. Pausing, paw in air, she contemplates us. She is small but not a kitten, a petite mutt of a tabby. Evidently, she decides we are not a threat, proceeds calmly to a dish in a corner and laps up the milk that was clearly left for her. Satisfied, she curls up after she is done and licks her paws, washes her face. We laugh at the incongruence of this little animal so close to Rikers. We wonder who feeds her.
From the van, headed over the bridge, I gaze out at the wide expanse of sludge that separates us from the island and yet, this is only a tiny gash in land mass that the sea has rushed in to fill. This journey would be nothing by boat, a fraction of the distance between Cape Town and Robben Island. And I have read that, before this bridge was built in the sixties, you could only get to Rikers by ferry.
A small boat could one day dock at Queens-side. I could board the ferry clutching my ticket on a warm afternoon. The wind would rush me on the top deck, air clean of stench, jail complex looming ahead. The ferry would pull into Rikers Island, and a tour guide would welcome us as we disembarked.
At the Brooklyn Botanic Gardens not far away, a small piece of land is preserved with the plant cover that was natural to New York hundreds of years ago. I imagine this same native vegetation allowed to twist and sprout at will across Rikers island. Willows shading the rocks near a sloped sandbank. The loam of tree roots and mushrooms in the damp of the woods. Just as they were, before we came here. The gates at Rikers open, cells empty but for lived echoes. Tourists peering through the bars, breathing in the ghosts. Nature spilling through cracks in the concrete.
Read More

Who are the new jihadis?

11:25 0

Biographies of ‘homegrown’ European terrorists show they are violent nihilists who adopt Islam, rather than religious fundamentalists who turn to violence


here is something new about the jihadi terrorist violence of the past two decades. Both terrorism and jihad have existed for many years, and forms of “globalised” terror – in which highly symbolic locations or innocent civilians are targeted, with no regard for national borders – go back at least as far as the anarchist movement of the late 19th century. What is unprecedented is the way that terrorists now deliberately pursue their own deaths.
Over the past 20 years – from Khaled Kelkal, a leader of a plot to bomb Paris trains in 1995, to the Bataclan killers of 2015 – nearly every terrorist in France blew themselves up or got themselves killed by the police. Mohamed Merah, who killed a rabbi and three children at a Jewish school in Toulouse in 2012, uttered a variant of a famous statement attributed to Osama bin Laden and routinely used by other jihadis: “We love death as you love life.” Now, the terrorist’s death is no longer just a possibility or an unfortunate consequence of his actions; it is a central part of his plan. The same fascination with death is found among the jihadis who join Islamic State. Suicide attacks are perceived as the ultimate goal of their engagement.
This systematic choice of death is a recent development. The perpetrators of terrorist attacks in France in the 1970s and 1980s, whether or not they had any connection with the Middle East, carefully planned their escapes. Muslim tradition, while it recognises the merits of the martyr who dies in combat, does not prize those who strike out in pursuit of their own deaths, because doing so interferes with God’s will. So, why, for the past 20 years, have terrorists regularly chosen to die? What does it say about contemporary Islamic radicalism? And what does it say about our societies today?
The latter question is all the more relevant as this attitude toward death is inextricably linked to the fact that contemporary jihadism, at least in the west – as well as in the Maghreb and in Turkey – is a youth movement that is not only constructed independently of parental religion and culture, but is also rooted in wider youth culture. This aspect of modern-day jihadism is fundamental.
Wherever such generational hatred occurs, it also takes the form of cultural iconoclasm. Not only are human beings destroyed, statues, places of worship and books are too. Memory is annihilated. “Wiping the slate clean,” is a goal common to Mao Zedong’s Red Guards, the Khmer Rouge and Isis fighters. As one British jihadi wrote in a recruitment guide for the organisation: “When we descend on the streets of London, Paris and Washington … not only will we spill your blood, but we will also demolish your statues, erase your history and, most painfully, convert your children who will then go on to champion our name and curse their forefathers.”
While all revolutions attract the energy and zeal of young people, most do not attempt to destroy what has gone before. The Bolshevik revolution decided to put the past into museums rather than reduce it to ruins, and the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran has never considered blowing up Persepolis.
This self-destructive dimension has nothing to do with the politics of the Middle East. It is even counterproductive as a strategy. Though Isis proclaims its mission to restore the caliphate, its nihilism makes it impossible to reach a political solution, engage in any form of negotiation, or achieve any stable society within recognised borders.
The caliphate is a fantasy. It is the myth of an ideological entity constantly expanding its territory. Its strategic impossibility explains why those who identify with it, instead of devoting themselves to the interests of local Muslims, have chosen to enter a death pact. There is no political perspective, no bright future, not even a place to pray in peace. But while the concept of the caliphate is indeed part of the Muslim religious imagination, the same cannot be said for the pursuit of death.
Additionally, suicide terrorism is not even effective from a military standpoint. While some degree of rationality can be found in “simple” terrorism – in which a few determined individuals inflict considerable damage on a far more powerful enemy – it is entirely absent from suicide attacks. The fact that hardened militants are used only once is not rational. Terrorist attacks do not bring western societies to their knees – they only provoke a counter-reaction. And this kind of terrorism today claims more Muslim than western lives.
An Islamic State fighter in Raqqa, Syria, 2014
 An Islamic State fighter in Raqqa, Syria, 2014. Photograph: Reuters
The systematic association with death is one of the keys to understanding today’s radicalisation: the nihilist dimension is central. What seduces and fascinates is the idea of pure revolt. Violence is not a means. It is an end in itself.
This is not the whole story: it is perfectly conceivable that other, more “rational”, forms of terrorism might soon emerge on the scene. It is also possible that this form of terrorism is merely temporary.
The reasons for the rise of Isis are without question related to the politics of the Middle East, and its demise will not change the basic elements of the situation. Isis did not invent terrorism: it draws from a pool that already exists. The genius of Isis is the way it offers young volunteers a narrative framework within which they can achieve their aspirations. So much the better for Isis if those who volunteer to die – the disturbed, the vulnerable, the rebel without a cause – have little to do with the movement, but are prepared to declare allegiance to Isis so that their suicidal acts become part of a global narrative.
This is why we need a new approach to the problem of Isis, one that seeks to understand contemporary Islamic violence alongside other forms of violence and radicalism that are very similar to it – those that feature generational revolt, self-destruction, a radical break with society, an aesthetic of violence, doomsday cults.
It is too often forgotten that suicide terrorism and organisations such as al-Qaida and Isis are new in the history of the Muslim world, and cannot be explained simply by the rise of fundamentalism. We must understand that terrorism does not arise from the radicalisation of Islam, but from the Islamisation of radicalism.

Far from exonerating Islam, the “Islamisation of radicalism” forces us to ask why and how rebellious youths have found in Islam the paradigm of their total revolt. It does not deny the fact that a fundamentalist Islam has been developing for more than 40 years.
There has been vocal criticism of this approach. One scholar claims that I have neglected the political causes of the revolt – essentially, the colonial legacy, western military interventions against peoples of the Middle East, and the social exclusion of immigrants and their children. From the other side, I have been accused of disregarding the link between terrorist violence and the religious radicalisation of Islam through Salafism, the ultra-conservative interpretation of the faith. I am fully aware of all of these dimensions; I am simply saying that they are inadequate to account for the phenomena we study, because no causal link can be found on the basis of the empirical data we have available.
My argument is that violent radicalisation is not the consequence of religious radicalisation, even if it often takes the same paths and borrows the same paradigms. Religious fundamentalism exists, of course, and it poses considerable societal problems, because it rejects values based on individual choice and personal freedom. But it does not necessarily lead to political violence.
The objection that radicals are motivated by the “suffering” experienced by Muslims who were formerly colonised, or victims of racism or any other sort of discrimination, US bombardments, drones, Orientalism, and so on, would imply that the revolt is primarily led by victims. But the relationship between radicals and victims is more imaginary than real.
Those who perpetrate attacks in Europe are not inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, Libya or Afghanistan. They are not necessarily the poorest, the most humiliated or the least integrated. The fact that 25% of jihadis are converts shows that the link between radicals and their “people” is also a largely imaginary construct.
Revolutionaries almost never come from the suffering classes. In their identification with the proletariat, the “masses” and the colonised, there is a choice based on something other than their objective situation. Very few terrorists or jihadis advertise their own life stories. They generally talk about what they have seen of others’ suffering. It was not Palestinians who shot up the Bataclan.
Up until the mid-1990s, most international jihadis came from the Middle East and had fought in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the communist regime there in 1992. Afterwards, they returned to their home countries to take part in jihad, or took the cause abroad. These were the people who mounted the first wave of “globalised” attacks (the first attempt on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, against the US embassies in East Africa in 1998 and the US Navy destroyer Cole in 2000).
This first generation of jihadis was mentored by the likes of Bin Laden, Ramzi Yousef and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed. But from 1995 onwards, a new breed began to develop – known in the west as the “homegrown terrorist”.

Who are these new radicals? We know many of their names thanks to police identification of perpetrators of attacks in Europe and the US. More still have been caught plotting attacks. We also have all the biographical information that has been gathered by journalists. There is no need to embark on painstaking fieldwork to figure out terrorist trajectories. All the data and profiles are available.
When it comes to understanding their motivations, we have traces of their speech: tweets, Google chats, Skype conversations, messages on WhatsApp and Facebook. They call their friends and family. They issue statements before they die and leave testaments on video. In short, even if we cannot be sure that we understand them, we are familiar with them.
We certainly have more information on the lives of terrorists operating in Europe than we do on jihadis who leave for foreign countries and never return. But, as a Sciences Po study on French jihadis who died in Syria has shown, there are many similarities between these groups. Here I will focus primarily on Franco-Belgians, who supply most of the ranks of western jihadis. But Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands also have significant contingents on the frontlines.
Using this information, I have compiled a database of roughly 100 people who have been involved in terrorism in France, or have left France or Belgium to take part in global jihad in the past 20 years. It includes the perpetrators of all the major attacks targeting French or Belgian territory.
Kouachi brothers
Pinterest
 The Kouachi brothers, who attacked the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris in 2015. Photograph: Handout/Getty Images
There is no standard terrorist profile, but there are recurrent characteristics. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the profiles have hardly changed over the past 20 years. Khaled Kelkal, France’s first homegrown terrorist, and the Kouachi brothers (Charlie Hebdo, Paris, 2015) share a number of common features: second generation; fairly well integrated at first; period of petty crime; radicalisation in prison; attack and death – weapons in hand – in a standoff with the police.
Another characteristic that all western countries have in common is that radicals are almost all “born-again” Muslims who, after living a highly secular life – frequenting clubs, drinking alcohol, involvement in petty crime – suddenly renew their religious observance, either individually or in the context of a small group. The Abdeslam brothers ran a Brussels bar and went out to nightclubs in the months preceding the Bataclan shooting. Most move into action in the months following their religious “reconversion” or “conversion”, but have usually already exhibited signs of radicalisation.
In almost every case, the processes by which a radical group is formed are nearly identical. The group’s membership is always the same: brothers, childhood friends, acquaintances from prison, sometimes from a training camp. The number of sets of siblings found is also remarkable.
This over-representation of siblings does not occur in any other context of radicalisation, whether on the extreme left or Islamist groups. It highlights the significance of the generational dimension of radicalisation.
As the former jihadi David Vallat has written, the radical preachers’ rhetoric could basically be summarised as: “Your father’s Islam is what the colonisers left behind, the Islam of those who bow down and obey. Our Islam is the Islam of combatants, of blood, of resistance.”
Radicals are in fact often orphans – as the Kouachi brothers were – or come from dysfunctional families. They are not necessarily rebelling against their parents personally, but against what they represent: humiliation, concessions made to society, and what they view as their religious ignorance.

Most of the new radicals are deeply immersed in youth culture: they go to nightclubs, pick up girls, smoke and drink. Nearly 50% of the jihadis in France, according to my database, have a history of petty crime – mainly drug dealing, but also acts of violence and, less frequently, armed robbery. A similar figure is found in Germany and the United States – including a surprising number of arrests for drunk driving. Their dress habits also conform to those of today’s youth: brands, baseball caps, hoods, in other words streetwear, and not even of the Islamic variety.
Their musical tastes are also those of the times: they like rap music and go out to clubs. One of the best-known radicalised figures is a German rapper, Denis Cuspert – first known as Deso Dogg, then as Abu Talha al-Almani – who went to fight in Syria. Naturally, they are also gaming enthusiasts and are fond of violent American movies.
Mohamed Merah
 Mohamed Merah carried out a series of gun attacks in France in 2012. Photograph: France 2 Television/EPA
Their violent tendencies can have outlets other than jihad and terrorism – as we see in the gang wars of Marseille. They can also be channelled, either by institutions – Mohammed Merah wanted to enlist in the army – or by sport. One group of Portuguese converts, most of whom were originally Angolan, left London to join Isis after bonding at a Thai boxing club started by a British NGO. Combat sport clubs are more important than mosques in jihadi social life.
The language spoken by radicals is always that of their country of residence. In France, they often switch to a Salafised version of French banlieue speech when they reconvert.
Prison time puts them in contact with radicalised “peers” and far outside of any institutionalised religion. Prison amplifies many of the factors that fuel contemporary radicalisation: the generational dimension; revolt against the system; the diffusion of a simplified Salafism; the formation of a tight-knit group; the search for dignity related to respect for the norm; and the reinterpretation of crime as legitimate political protest.
Another common feature is the radicals’ distance from their immediate circle. They did not live in a particularly religious environment. Their relationship to the local mosque was ambivalent: either they attended episodically, or they were expelled for having shown disrespect for the local imam. None of them belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, none of them had worked with a Muslim charity, none of them had taken part in proselytising activities, none of them were members of a Palestinian solidarity movement, and lastly, none of themto my knowledge, took part in the rioting in French suburbs in 2005. They were not first radicalised by a religious movement before turning to terrorism.
If indeed there was religious radicalisation, it did not occur in the framework of Salafi mosques, but individually or within the group. The only exceptions are in Britain, which has a network of militant mosques frequented by members of al-Muhajiroun, which gave rise to an even more radical group, Sharia4UK, led by Anjem Choudary. The question is therefore when and where jihadis embrace religion. Religious fervour arises outside community structures, belatedly, fairly suddenly, and not long before terrorists move into action.
British jihadis Mohammed el-Araj and Choukri Ellekhlifi with their Dutch trainer, fighting for Islamic State in Syria, 2013
 The late British jihadis Mohammed el-Araj and Choukri Ellekhlifi with their Dutch trainer (centre), fighting for Islamic State in Syria, 2013. Photograph: Stewart News/Rex Shutterstock
To summarise: the typical radical is a young, second-generation immigrant or convert, very often involved in episodes of petty crime, with practically no religious education, but having a rapid and recent trajectory of conversion/reconversion, more often in the framework of a group of friends or over the internet than in the context of a mosque. The embrace of religion is rarely kept secret, but rather is exhibited, but it does not necessarily correspond to immersion in religious practice. The rhetoric of rupture is violent – the enemy is kafir, one with whom no compromise is possible – but also includes their own family, the members of which are accused of observing Islam improperly, or refusing to convert.
At the same time, it is obvious that the radicals’ decision to identify with jihad and to claim affiliation with a radical Islamic group is not merely an opportunistic choice: the reference to Islam makes all the difference between jihad and the other forms of violence that young people indulge in. Pointing out this pervasive culture of violence does not amount to “exonerating” IslamThe fact that these young people choose Islam as a framework for thought and action is fundamental, and it is precisely the Islamisation of radicalism that we must strive to understand.

Aside from the common characteristics discussed above, there is no typical social and economic profile of the radicalised. There is a popular and very simplistic explanation that views terrorism as the consequence of unsuccessful integration – and thus the harbinger of a civil war to come – without for a moment taking into account the masses of well-integrated and socially ascendant Muslims. It is, for instance, an unassailable fact that in France far more Muslims are enrolled in the police and security forces than are involved in jihad.
Furthermore, radicals do not come from hardline communities. The Abdeslam brothers’ Brussels bar sat in a neighbourhood that has been described as “Salafised” – which would therefore be off-limits to people who drink liquor and women not wearing the hijab. But this example shows that the reality of these neighbourhoods is more complex than we are led to believe.
It is very common to view jihadism as an extension of Salafism. Not all Salafis are jihadis, but all jihadis are supposedly Salafis, and so Salafism is the gateway to jihadism. In a word, religious radicalisation is considered to be the first stage of political radicalisation. But things are more complicated than that, as we have seen.
Clearly, however, these young radicals are sincere believers: they truly believe that they will go to heaven, and their frame of reference is deeply Islamic. They join organisations that want to set up an Islamic system, or even, in the case of Isis, to restore the caliphate. But what form of Islam are we talking about?
As we have seen, jihadis do not descend into violence after poring over sacred texts. They do not have the necessary religious culture – and, above all, care little about having one. They do not become radicals because they have misread the texts or because they have been manipulated. They are radicals because they choose to be, because only radicalism appeals to them. No matter what database is taken as a reference, the paucity of religious knowledge among jihadis is glaring. According to leaked Isis records containing details for more than 4,000 foreign recruits, while most of the fighters are well-educated, 70% state that they have only basic knowledge of Islam.
It is important to distinguish here between the version of Islam espoused by Isis itself, which is much more grounded in the methodological tradition of exegesis of the prophet Muhammad’s words, and ostensibly based on the work of “scholars” – and the Islam of the jihadis who claim allegiance to Isis, which first of all revolves around a vision of heroism and modern-day violence.
The scriptural exegeses that fill the pages of Dabiq and Dar al-Islam, the two recent Isis magazines written in English and French, are not the cause of radicalisation. They help to provide a theological rationalisation for the violence of the radicals – based not on real knowledge, but an appeal to authority. When young jihadis speak of “truth”, it is never in reference to discursive knowledge. They are referring to their own certainty, sometimes supported by an incantatory reference to the sheikhs, whom they have never read. For example Cédric, a converted Frenchman, claimed at his own trial: “I’m not a keyboard jihadi, I didn’t convert on YouTube. I read the scholars, the real ones.” He said this even though he cannot read Arabic and met the members of his network over the internet.
It probably makes sense to start by listening to what the terrorists say. The same themes recur with all of them, summed up in the posthumous statement made by Mohammad Siddique Khan, leader of the group that carried out the London bombings on 7 July 2005.
The first motivation he cited is atrocities committed by western countries against the “Muslim people” (in the transcript he says, “my people all over the world”); the second is the role of avenging hero (“I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters,” “Now you too will taste the reality of this situation”); the third is death (“We love death as much as you love life”), and his reception in heaven (“May Allah ... raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs”).
The Muslim community such terrorists are eager to avenge is almost never specified. It is a non-historical and non-spatial reality. When they rail against western policy in the Middle East, jihadis use the term “crusaders”; they do not refer to the French colonisation of Algeria.
French police officers near the scene of Mohamed Merah’s death, Toulouse, France, 2012
 French police officers near the scene of Mohamed Merah’s death, Toulouse, France, 2012. Photograph: Bob Edme/AP
Radicals never refer explicitly to the colonial period. They reject or disregard all political and religious movements that have come before them. They do not align themselves with the struggles of their fathers; almost none of them go back to their parents’ countries of origin to wage jihad. It is noteworthy that none of the jihadis, whether born Muslim or converted, has to my knowledge campaigned as part of a pro-Palestinian movement or belonged to any sort of association to combat Islamophobia, or even an Islamic NGO. These radicalised youths read texts in French or English circulating over the internet, but not works in Arabic.
Oddly enough, the defenders of the Islamic State never talk about sharia and almost never about the Islamic society that will be built under the auspices of Isis. Those who say that they went to Syria because they wanted “to live in a true Islamic society” are typically returnees who deny having participated in violence while there – as if wanting to wage jihad and wanting to live according to Islamic law were incompatible. And they are, in a way, because living in an Islamic society does not interest jihadis: they do not go to the Middle East to live, but to die. That is the paradox: these young radicals are not utopians, they are nihilists.
What is more radical about the new radicals than earlier generations of revolutionaries, Islamists and Salafis is their hatred of existing societies, whether western or Muslim. This hatred is embodied in the pursuit of their own death when committing mass murder. They kill themselves along with the world they reject. Since 11 September 2001, this is the radicals’ preferred modus operandi.
The suicidal mass killer is unfortunately a common contemporary figure. The typical example is the American school shooter, who goes to his school heavily armed, indiscriminately kills as many people as possible, then kills himself or lets himself be killed by the police. He has already posted photographs, videos and statements online. In them he assumed heroic poses and delighted in the fact that everyone would now know who he was. In the United States there were 50 attacks or attempted attacks of this sort between 1999 and 2016.
The boundaries between a suicidal mass killer of this sort and a militant for the caliphate are understandably hazy. The Nice killer, for instance, was first described as mentally ill and later as an Isis militant whose crime had been premeditated. But these ideas are not mutually exclusive.
The point here is not to mix all these categories together. Each one is specific, but there is a striking common thread that runs through the mass murders perpetrated by disaffected, nihilistic and suicidal youths. What organisations like al-Qaida and Isis provide is a script.

The strength of Isis is to play on our fears. And the principal fear is the fear of Islam. The only strategic impact of the attacks is their psychological effect. They do not affect the west’s military capabilities; they even strengthen them, by putting an end to military budget cuts. They have a marginal economic effect, and only jeopardise our democratic institutions to the extent that we ourselves call them into question through the everlasting debate on the conflict between security and the rule of law. The fear is that our own societies will implode and there will be a civil war between Muslims and the “others”.
We ask ourselves what Islam wants, what Islam is, without for a moment realising that this world of Islam does not exist; that the ummah is at best a pious wish and at worst an illusion; that the conflicts are first and foremost among Muslims themselves; that the key to these conflicts is first of all political; that national issues remain the key to the Middle East and social issues the key to integration.
Certainly Isis, like al-Qaida, has fashioned a grandiose imaginary system in which it pictures itself as conquering and defeating the west. It is a huge fantasy, like all millenarian ideologies. But, unlike the major secular ideologies of the 20th century, jihadism has a very narrow social and political base. As we have seen, it does not mobilise the masses, and only draws in those on the fringe.
There is a temptation to see in Islam a radical ideology that mobilises throngs of people in the Muslim world, just as Nazism was able to mobilise large sections of the German population. But the reality is that Isis’s pretension to establish a global caliphate is a delusion – that is why it draws in violent youngsters who have delusions of grandeur.
Read More

Post Top Ad